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Nearly twenty-one million men, women, and children worldwide
are victims of human trafficking,' earning an estimated $31.6 billion in
profits for the perpetrators of these crimes. 2 Human trafficking is the
third-largest and the fastest-growing criminal enterprise in the world. 3
Of the nearly twenty-one million trafficking victims, approximately 4.5
million are victims of some form of sex trafficking.4 Although human
trafficking primarily takes place outside of the developed world, the
International Labour Organization estimates there are some 1.5 million
trafficking victims in developed countries.5 In particular, as many as
17,500 foreign nationals are trafficked into the United States annually.6
However, the number of trafficking victims in the United States
is not limited to those who are trafficked across borders into the
country. Instead, human trafficking does not actually require
transportation-much less transportation across a border.7 In its
broadest conception, human trafficking is defined as:
[T]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of
the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of
the abuse of power or ofaposition of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the
purpose of exploitation.8
1. SPECIAL ACTION PROGRAMME TO COMBAT FORCED LABOUR, INT'L LABOUR ORG., ILO
GLOBAL ESTIMATE OF FORCED LABOUR 11, 13 (2012), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/---ed-norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_182004.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cclQE2V-3LKH. As the ILO itself states, this is a conservative estimate. Id.
2. Patrick Belser, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking: Estimating the Profits 1, 17 (Int'l
Labour Office, Working Paper No. 42, 2005), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/---ed.norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_081971.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/6FRV-B7ZJ.
3. Amanda Walker-Rodriguez & Rodney Hill, Human Sex Trafficking, FBI L.
ENFORCEMENT BULL., Mar. 2011, at 1, 2, available at http://leb.fbi.gov/2011/march/leb-march-
2011, archived at http://perma.cc/V7VD-49EW.
4. Belser, supra note 2, at 13.
5. SPECIAL ACTION PROGRAMME TO COMBAT FORCED LABOUR, supra note 1, at 16. The ILO
defines this group of countries as the EU, the United States, Canada, Australia, Israel, Japan,
New Zealand, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. Id. at 43.
6. ALISON SISKIN & LIANA SUN WYLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34317, TRAFFICKING IN
PERSONS: U.S. POLICY AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1, 15 (2013), available at http://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/rowRL34317.pdf, archived at http://perma.cclH3UW-3PHR.
7. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 1, 29 (2013), available at
http://www.state.gov/documentslorganization/210737.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8UJ3-2K5R
("Human trafficking can include but does not require movement.").
8. U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children art. 3(a), opened for signature Dec. 12, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 (emphasis added),
available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/treatiesUNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/
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Accordingly, a majority of human trafficking victims never cross
international borders.9 While the precise number of human trafficking
victims in the United States is difficult to quantify,10 it is nonetheless
clear that trafficking is a significant domestic issue because of both its
prevalence in the United States" and its heinous nature.12 Further, in
the United States, commercial sexual exploitation is the most prevalent
form of human trafficking, which underscores the particularly
nefarious character of this issue.13
In light of the gravity and prevalence of domestic trafficking, the
United States has taken significant steps, both at the federal and state
TOCebook-e.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/FG94-CHWX [hereinafter Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons].
9. According to a Department of State study, there are six hundred thousand to eight
hundred thousand victims trafficked across borders each year, while there are two million to four
million total trafficking victims. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 23 (2004).
There is some reason to think the methodology behind the Department of State's study on
trafficking was suspect. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-825, HUMAN TRAFFICKING:
BETTER DATA, STRATEGY, AND REPORTING NEEDED TO ENHANCE U.S. ANTITRAFFICKING EFFORTS
ABROAD 2 (2006). Nevertheless, the study reveals the disparity between victims trafficked across
borders (six hundred thousand to eight hundred thousand annually) and total trafficking victims
(two million to four million). See SISKIN & WYLER, supra note 6, at 7 n.23.
10. See SISKIN & WYLER, supra note 6, at 16 n.70 (discussing difficulties in estimating the
total number of trafficking victims in the United States).
11. Although the precise scope of the problem is difficult to quantify, studies indicate that
the problem is serious. See, e.g., RICHARD J. ESTES & NEIL A. WEINER, THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN IN THE U.S., CANADA, AND MEXICO 13 (2001) (estimating that between
244,000 and 286,000 children are at risk for sexual exploitation in the United States), available at
https://maggiemeneill.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/estes-weiner-2001.pdf, archived at
https://perma.ccl4NKP-4CBB.
12. In a speech in 2012, the longest speech on slavery given by a U.S. president since
Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, President Obama said:
It ought to concern every person, because it is a debasement of our common humanity. It
ought to concern every community, because it tears at our social fabric. It ought to
concern every business, because it distorts markets. It ought to concern every nation,
because it endangers public health and fuels violence and organized crime. I'm talking
about the injustice, the outrage, of human trafficking, which must be called by its true
name-modern slavery.... It is barbaric, and it is evil, and it has no place in a civilized
world.
President Barack Obama, Keynote Address at the Clinton Global Initiative (Sept. 25, 2012),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/25/remarks-president-clinton-
global-initiative, archived at http://perma.cc/59S6-UPTD.
13. See LOUISE SHELLY, HUMAN TRAFFICKING: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 262 (2010)
("American trafficking is unique among Western developed democracies in having a significant
problem of internal trafficking of its own citizens, particularly juveniles."); Human Trafficking
Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 2011), available at http://ojp.gov/newsroom/factsheets/
ojpfs-humantrafficking. html, archived at http://perma.cc/3AR3-N4WM (noting that sex trafficking
accounted for eighty-two percent of reported human trafficking incidents in the United States
between January 2008 and June 2010). While other forms of trafficking, such as forced labor, debt
bondage, and organ trafficking, are all clearly problems that the United States needs to address,
see SHELLY, supra, at 233-35, this Note focuses exclusively on sex trafficking.
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levels, to address human trafficking within its borders.14 In 2013,
Congress affirmed its commitment to battling human trafficking by
reauthorizing the Trafficking Victims Protection Act ("TVPA"),15
designed to comprehensively address human trafficking. 16 Moreover, all
states currently have antitrafficking legislation in some form.17
In spite of these efforts, however, some questions about the
effectiveness of the TVPA remain.18 The TVPA only criminalizes
"severe" sex trafficking, defined as "sex trafficking in which a
commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which
the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of
age."19 In contrast, the TVPA broadly defines "sex trafficking" as "the
recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a
person for the purpose of a commercial sex act," 20 which would include
the acts of many "pimps"21 in ordinary prostitution.22 Because the TPVA
14. See, e.g., Hon. Toko Serita, In Our Own Backyards: The Need for a Coordinated Judicial
Response to Human Trafficking, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 635, 645 (2012) (labeling the
TVPA "an ambitious endeavor by Congress to combat human trafficking in the United States");
Human Trafficking State Ratings Show Progress in 39 States, POLARIS PROJECT (Aug. 14, 2013)
(noting thirty-two states now ranked in Polaris Project's top tier, indicating the state has passed
substantial antitrafficking laws, an increase over eleven states in 2011), http://
www.polarisproject.org/media-center/news-and-press/press-releases/852-human-trafficking-
state-ratings-show-progress-in-39-states, archived at http://perma.cclU598-BJSQ.
15. Valerie Jarrett, No One Should Have to Live in Fear of Violence, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG
(Mar. 7, 2013, 3:20 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/valerie-jarrett/no-one-should-have-to-
liv b_2830510.html, archived at http://perma.cclNL6Z-6KX7.
16. Generally, the TVPA comprises a three-pronged approach aimed at protecting victims of
trafficking, prosecuting perpetrators, and implementing general preventative measures. See
SHELLY, supra note 13, at 259-60.
17. See Wyoming Becomes 50th State to Outlaw Human Trafficking, POLARIS PROJECT (Feb.
27, 2013), http://www.polarisproject.org/media-center/news-and-press/press-releases/742-
wyoming-becomes-50th-state-to-outlaw-human-trafficking, archived at http://perma.cc/VJ9Y-
UWRN.
18. See infra notes 63-79 and accompanying text.
19. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9)(A) (2012).
20. Id. § 7102(10).
21. As Black's Law Dictionary defines it, a pimp is "[a] person who solicits customers for a
prostitute, [usually] in return for a share of the prostitute's earnings." Pimp, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1333 (10th ed. 2014). However, in reality, a pimp functions as far more than just an
agent for a prostitute-frequently, a pimp will identify a vulnerable individual, establish a
relationship with her, and gradually groom her to become a prostitute. See Stephen C. Parker &
Jonathan T. Skrmetti, Pimps Down: A Prosecutorial Perspective on Domestic Sex Trafficking, 43
U. MEM. L. REV. 1013, 1023-29 (2013) (describing the process by which pimp recruits individuals
and trains them to become prostitutes).
22. Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Aspects of the Victims of Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Integration of the Human Rights of Women and a
Gender Perspective, ¶ 42, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2006/62 (Feb. 20, 2006) (by Sigma Huda) ("[P]rostitution as actually practised in the world
usually does satisfy the elements of trafficking."); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Trafficking,
Prostitution, and Inequality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271, 299 (2011) ("Trafficking is
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only criminalizes severe sex trafficking, it is difficult for federal
prosecutors to secure convictions in all but the most incontrovertible of
cases.23 Although all states criminalize activities commonly referred to
as pimping,24 suggesting that individuals not engaged in severe sex
trafficking should be prosecuted on the state level, state and local police
have historically targeted prostitutes. 25 Thus, pimps and traffickers
whose actions may not rise to the level of severe sex trafficking often
escape both federal and state prosecution and operate with effective
impunity.
While such considerations led the U.S. House of Representatives
to pass a significantly more stringent version of the TVPA in 2007, the
final, enacted version of the reauthorization bill significantly watered
down the scope and the strength of its criminal provisions. 26 Opposition
came from both feminist scholars, who argued against conflating all
prostitution with sex trafficking, 27 and from federalists, who opposed
the national government's intrusion into an area of the law traditionally
left to the states.28 In response to this tension, this Note proposes the
transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of a human being for purposes of sexual exploitation:
it is straight-up pimping.").
23. See, e.g., Moira Heiges, Note, From the Inside Out: Reforming State and Local
Prostitution Enforcement to Combat Sex Trafficking in the United States and Abroad, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 428, 451-52 (2009) (noting that "sex trafficking cases are extremely difficult to prove"); Letter
from the Coal. Against Trafficking in Women to the Hon. Peter Keisler, Acting Att'y Gen. of the
U.S. (Oct. 5, 2007) ("Requiring proof of force, fraud, and coercion has ... had a detrimental effect
on the prosecution of cases of domestic trafficking."), available at https://web.archive.org/
web/20110205074321/http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/catw-letter.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/
FB6S-2XKG.
24. See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text (discussing different states' varying forms
of antipimping offenses).
25. See infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text (noting extremely low levels of
enforcement of pimping crimes).
26. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122
Stat. 5044 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
27. See, e.g., Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft),
105 HARv. L. REV. 1045, 1054 (1992) ("Anti-prostitution rules terrorize the female
body.... Prostitution regulation also occurs through a network of cultural practices that endanger
sex workers'lives and make their work terrifying."); Elizabeth Kaigh, Comment, Whores and Other
Sex Slaves: Why the Equation of Prostitution with Sex Trafficking in the William Wilberforce
Reauthorization Act of 2008 Promotes Gender Discrimination, 12 SCHOLAR 139, 172 (2009)
("Equating consensual commercial sex acts with non-consensual sex trafficking is inherently
discriminatory against the women who are selling sex by choice.").
28. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DOJ POSITION ON H.R. 3887, at 1
(on file with author) (noting that "[plimping, pandering, and other prostitution-related
offenses . . . have always been prosecuted at the state or local level"); Brian W. Walsh & Andrew
M. Grossman, Human Trafficking Reauthorization Would Undermine Existing Anti-Trafficking
Efforts and Constitutional Federalism, LEGAL MEMORANDUM, Sept. 14, 2008, at 1, 7-8, available
at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/02/human-trafficking-reauthorization-would-
undermine-existing-anti-trafficking-efforts-and-constitutional-federalism, archived at http://
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creation of a new federal offense for pimping. The proposal attempts to
address some of the challenges of prosecuting sex trafficking cases, but
with a limited scope designed to avoid the pitfalls of previous attempts
to alter the TVPA.
Part II of this Note discusses the TVPA and evaluates its success
in combatting sex trafficking. Part III explores the relationship between
sex trafficking and prostitution, recognizing that the two industries are
inextricably linked. Part IV then examines the particular problem of
pimping, noting that many individuals commonly thought of as pimps
engage in actions that could be classified as sex trafficking. Part IV also
discusses a failed attempt to pass legislation in Congress to address the
problem of pimping and why the attempt failed. Finally, Part V
proposes the creation of a new federal offense for activities commonly
referred to as pimping. The proposal is structured to allow federal
prosecutors to better target sex traffickers and pimps, while avoiding a
number of the issues that prior proposed legislation encountered.
II. THE LAW OF SEX TRAFFICKING
States have traditionally used their police powers to regulate29
or criminalize30 prostitution and other crimes relating to public
morality.31 In contrast, the "modern legal infrastructure" of sex
trafficking-including criminal penalties for sex trafficking at both the
federal and state levels-has only emerged in recent years. 32 However,
despite a bevy of recent sex trafficking-oriented legislation on both the
state and federal levels, the overall effectiveness of current sex
trafficking legislation is still questionable. 33
perma.cc/7VKE-52KB (arguing that Commerce Clause does not grant Congress authority to
regulate "run-of-the-mill sex crimes" such as pimping and pandering).
29. See Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 244.345 (LexisNexis 2013) (allowing counties to regulate
prostitution in limited circumstances).
30. See Daniel J. Franklin, Prostitution and Sex Workers, 8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 355, 356
n.5 (2007) (listing state prostitution statutes).
31. See Heiges, supra note 23, at 435.
32. Kelly Heinrich & Kavitha Sreeharsha, The State of State Human Trafficking Laws,
JUDGES' J., Winter 2013, available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/judges-journal/
2013/winter/thestateof_statehumantraffickinglaws.html, archived at http://perma.ccl3TRJ-
NAM9.
33. See, e.g., Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, What Is Choice? Examining Sex Trafficking
Legislation Through the Lenses of Rape Law and Prostitution, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 54, 65 (2008)
("Critics, however, point out that compared to the number of trafficking victims estimated to be in
the United States, the number of prosecutions has been minimal.").
[Vol. 68:3:961966
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A. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act
Congress created the TVPA in 2000 as a comprehensive piece of
legislation intended to combat human trafficking on a global level.34
Specifically, the TVPA seeks to "combat trafficking in persons, a
contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are
predominantly women and children," 35 through three primary means:
prosecuting traffickers, protecting human trafficking victims, and
preventing human trafficking worldwide. 36 Although the TVPA is an
extremely broad piece of legislation with numerous elements that could
be both lauded37 and critiqued, 38 this Note limits its focus to the TVPA's
approach to prosecution of sex trafficking crimes.
One of the TVPA's hallmarks was the creation of a new criminal
offense for the "[s]ex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or
coercion."39 In short, § 1591 criminalizes, when in or affecting interstate
or foreign commerce, knowingly recruiting, enticing, harboring,
transporting, providing, obtaining, or maintaining a person for the
purposes of causing that person "to engage in a commercial sex act,"
either by "means of force, fraud, or coercion," or where the individual is
a minor. 40 There is a fifteen-year minimum sentence for an offense
34. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat.
1464 (2000) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7113 (2012)).
35. 22 U.S.C. § 7101.
36. See, e.g., Jennifer A.L. Sheldon-Sherman, The Missing 'P"- Prosecution, Prevention,
Protection, and Partnership in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 443,
452 (2012).
37. See, e.g., Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 21, at 1045 (praising the TVPA as "a powerful
tool to punish and deter all sex traffickers and to protect the vulnerable people sex traffickers
victimize"); Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 36, at 452-57 (detailing the three primary objectives of
the TVPA).
38. Geneva Brown, Women and Children Last: The Prosecution of Sex Traffickers as Sex
Offenders and the Need for a Sex Trafficker Registry, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 25 (2011) ("[The
TVPA] fails to take a gender and rights approach to the problem [of trafficking]."); Dina Francesca
Haynes, (Not) Found Chained to a Bed in a Brothel: Conceptual, Legal, and Procedural Failures
to Fulfill the Promise of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 337, 345-46
(2007) (criticizing the TVPA as not being truly victim centric); Ronald Weitzer, Sex Trafficking
and the Sex Industry: The Need for Evidence-Based Theory and Legislation, 101 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1337, 1349-50 (2011) (expressing concern with evidence underlying the TVPA).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2012).
40. § 1591(a). Reprinted in full, § 1591(a) provides:
(a) Whoever knowingly-
(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce . . . recruits, entices, harbors,
transports, provides, obtains, or maintains by any means a person; or
(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in
a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph (1),
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committed by use of force, fraud, or coercion, or where the victim was a
minor under fourteen years old at the time of the offense. 41
Alternatively, where the victim was a minor at least fourteen years old
but less than eighteen years old, the minimum sentence is ten years. 42
Interestingly, § 1591 does not criminalize all activities that could
be defined as sex trafficking. In addition to force, fraud, or coercion, the
Palermo Protocol, the definitive international agreement on human
trafficking, includes "the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability"
as additional means of human trafficking. 43 Further, in providing
general definitions for the TVPA in 22 U.S.C. § 7102, Congress broadly
defined "sex trafficking" as "the recruitment, harboring, transportation,
provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex
act." 4 4 However, § 1591-the actual federal crime of sex trafficking-
only criminalizes "severe sex trafficking," which 22 U.S.C. § 7102
defines as trafficking through means of "force, fraud, or coercion," or
where the victim is under the age of eighteen. 45 Therefore, absent
evidence of force, fraud, or coercion, the recruitment, harboring,
transportation, provision, or obtaining of an individual eighteen years
of age or older for commercial sexual activities is not a criminal activity
under the TVPA.
Although the TVPA marked the first time the federal
government recognized trafficking in persons as a specific criminal
offense,46 the Mann Act of 191047 can also be used to prosecute sex
trafficking cases, provided that the individual was actually transported
in interstate or foreign commerce. 48 The provision pertinent to sex
knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of
force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such
means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or
that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to
engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in subsection
(b).
For a more thorough analysis of the elements required under § 1591, see Parker & Skrmetti, supra
note 21, at 1030-45.
41. § 1591(b)(1).
42. § 1591(b)(2).
43. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, supra note 8, at art.
3(a).
44. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(10).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1591; 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9)(A).
46. Mohammed Y. Mattar, Interpreting Judicial Interpretations of the Criminal Statutes of
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act: Ten Years Later, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 1247,
1250 (2011).
47. Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (2012). The Mann Act is also known as the "White
Slave Traffic Act." Jennifer M. Chac6n, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S.
Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 3013 (2006).
48. Mattar, supra note 46, at 1250.
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trafficking, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a), reads, "Whoever knowingly persuades,
induces, entices, or coerces any individual to travel in interstate or
foreign commerce . .. to engage in prostitution .. . or attempts to do so,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or
both."49 Notably, because prosecutors are not required to prove the use
of force, fraud, or coercion under the Mann Act,50 the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") frequently brings cases under the Mann Act rather than
18 U.S.C. § 1591.51
The passage of the TVPA helped spur many states to pass
legislation to combat trafficking. 52 Currently, all fifty states have
passed antitrafficking legislation in some form.53 Although much of this
legislation is modeled after § 1591,54 several states have even
implemented reforms that are more comprehensive than federal
policies.55 However, the implementation and effectiveness of these new
laws has been lackluster thus far, as human trafficking is still rarely
prosecuted on a state or local level.56
B. The TVPA's Effectiveness
The TVPA and similar state statutes are widely considered
positive steps to combat human trafficking. 57 The TVPA helped bring
public awareness to a world of crime that previously had not received
the attention its heinous nature demanded.58 Since the TVPA's
enactment, the DOJ has dedicated significant resources that have led
49. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a) (emphasis added).
50. See Mattar, supra note 46, at 1251 ("Unlike the TVPA, the Mann Act does not require
proof of force, fraud, or coercion.").
51. See Jessica Neuwirth, President, Equality Now, Statement to the New York City Council
(June 11, 2008), available at http://www.equalitynow.org/node/954, archived at
http://perma.cc/9AS5-Z6RM ("Most of [the DOJ's sex trafficking] cases are cases they have brought
under the Mann Act because the Mann Act does not require proof of force, fraud or coercion."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
52. See Heinrich & Sreeharsha, supra note 32 (discussing the "wave of state statutes
enacted" since the initial passage of the TVPA).
53. Id.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1591.
55. For example, the New York legislature enacted a "safe harbor" law that supports the
treatment of minors arrested for prostitution as victims instead of criminals. See Megan Annitto,
Consent, Coercion, and Compassion: Emerging Legal Responses to the Commercial Sexual
Exploitation of Minors, 30 YALE L. & POLY REV. 1, 46-53 (2011).
56. See Heinrich & Sreeharsha, supra note 32 (discussing numerous implementation issues
that have resulted in only rare prosecution of trafficking on the state or local level).
57. See, e.g., Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 21, at 1045 (calling the TVPA "a powerful tool"
in the fight against sex trafficking).
58. See, e.g., Chac6n, supra note 47, at 3017 (labeling the TVPA as "instrumental in bringing
to public attention the gravity of the crime of human trafficking").
2015]1 969
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to the successful prosecution of over one thousand traffickers. 59 Indeed,
in 2007, the DOJ prosecuted six times as many human trafficking cases
as it prosecuted in 2001,60 and it experienced a 581 percent increase in
convictions and guilty pleas of traffickers for fiscal years 2001 to 2008
compared to the previous eight-year period.61
Despite the steps taken at both the federal and state levels to
increase prosecution of traffickers, 62 there are still reasons to question
whether the TVPA's criminal provisions are aggressive enough.63 While
the DOJ has pointed to that 581 percent increase in the number of
convictions in human trafficking cases,64 because the overall number of
DOJ prosecutions and convictions before the TVPA was so low (seventy-
six over the course of eight years), the comparative increase in
prosecutions and convictions is not indicative of the overall
effectiveness of the TVPA's criminal provisions.65 To use an analogy to
help illustrate this point, if I had $3 yesterday, and $18 today, while it
is correct to state that I am six times richer today than I was yesterday,
that does not mean that I am actually rich today.66 Accordingly,
although the DOJ did technically experience a 581 percent increase in
convictions of traffickers from 2001 to 2008 compared to the previous
eight-year period,67 the meager seventy-six human trafficking-related
convictions over that previous eight-year period68 makes the 581
percent increase seem far less impressive.
In addition, although Congress may not have intended for § 1591
to be overly burdensome for prosecutors, 69 sex trafficking cases remain
59. See, e.g., Mark J. Kappelhoff, Federal Prosecutions of Human Trafficking Cases: Striking
a Blow Against Modern Day Slavery, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 9, 16 (2008) (noting significant increases
in the number of investigations, prosecutions, and convictions of traffickers since the TVPA was
enacted); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 28, at 1 (discussing the DOJ's "successful anti-
trafficking strategy").
60. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 28, at 1.
61. Kappelhoff, supra note 59, at 16.
62. See supra Part II.A (discussing implementation ofantitrafficking legislation).
63. See, e.g., Cianciarulo, supra note 33, at 65 (noting that the number of prosecutions under
TVPA has been extremely low).
64. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 28, at 1.
65. Compare Kappelhoff, supra note 59, at 16 (noting that in fiscal years 1993-2000, there
were only ninety-five prosecutions for trafficking-related offenses and only seventy-six
convictions), with SISKIN & WYLER, supra note 6, at 30 (noting that in fiscal year 2010, federal law
enforcement prosecuted 181 individuals for trafficking and obtained 141 convictions).
66. My thanks to Matt Gornick for this analogy.
67. Kappelhoff, supra note 59, at 16.
68. Id.
69. See Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 21, at 1040 ("Congress intended the force, fraud, and
coercion element to broadly and expansively cover a wide range of manipulative, threatening, and
violent conduct. . . .").
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difficult to prove.7 0 Because of the rigorous requirement to prove force,
fraud, or coercion, some federal prosecutors are only willing to prosecute
"slam-dunk" cases.71 In fact, because the force, fraud, or coercion
requirement does not apply when the victim is a minor, one U.S.
Attorney went so far as to say that "[my office] only took cases in which
there was a child involved, although it's a federal crime to take an
adult."7 2 One difficulty in proving force, fraud, or coercion could be the
unusual relationships between the victims and those who engage in
trafficking. 73 Because traffickers and pimps often recruit their victims
under the guise of romantic relationships, a victim may be unwilling to
testify against a trafficker even after being trafficked. 74 Further, a
victim may often fear retribution for testifying against her trafficker.75
Moreover, prosecutors often do not have other evidence
necessary to prove the elements of force, fraud, or coercion.76 Because
federal prosecutors often receive human trafficking cases from local law
enforcement officials after the local officials have already conducted an
70. See Lauren Hersh, Sex Trafficking Investigations and Prosecutions, in LAWYER'S
MANUAL ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING 255, 256 (Jill Laurie Goodman & Dorchen A. Leidholdt eds.,
2011) ("Effective prosecution of sex trafficking cases is an extraordinarily challenging task.");
Heiges, supra note 23, at 451-52 (citing multiple reports indicating trafficking cases are difficult
to prove); see also Norma Ramos, Addressing Domestic Human Trafficking, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
21, 23 (2008) (noting that the force, fraud, or coercion requirement has made § 1591 "an ineffective
prosecutorial instrument").
71. See AMY FARRELL ET AL., IDENTIFYING CHALLENGES TO IMPROVE THE INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION OF STATE AND LOCAL HUMAN TRAFFICKING CASES 197-98 (2012), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238795.pdf, archived at http://perma.ccl66L7-U8XB.
72. Id. at 199.
73. See, e.g., Hersh, supra note 70, at 256 (noting the "complexity of the victim-trafficker
relationship" makes trafficking cases more difficult to prosecute).
74. See id. at 262 ("Breaking the pimp's control over the victim is one of the greatest
challenges that prosecutors face."); Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 21, at 1025-29 (describing
process used by pimps and traffickers to make victims fall in love with them).
75. See SISKIN & WYLER, supra note 6, at 30 ("[Tlhe successful prosecution of trafficking
cases relies on the availability of witnesses who may refuse to testify because of fear of retribution
against themselves or their families."); Hersh, supra note 70, at 256 ("[V]ictims are likely to be too
frail, too frightened, or too traumatized to provide much help in building cases or to testify before
grand juries or in open court."). This can be exacerbated by the fact that victims are typically
predisposed to distrust the police, both because they may have been engaged in criminal activity
other than the sale of sex and because police often treat victims leaving the commercial sex trade
like criminals, because their status as trafficking victims often only becomes clear after their
arrests for prostitution. See id. at 261 ("Arresting a victim also confirms what many traffickers tell
victims: that law enforcement will never believe her and will'lock her up.' ").
76. See AMY FARRELL ET AL., supra note 71, at 200; MARK MOTIVANS & TRACEY
KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING,
2001-2005, at 1 (2006) (noting that from 2001 to 2005, federal prosecutors declined to prosecute
suspects in 222 trafficking matters, and that lack of sufficient admissible evidence was the second-
leading cause for these decisions after lack of evidence of criminal intent).
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investigation and made an arrest,7 the prosecutors are not able to
gather the evidence necessary to convict under § 1591.78 This stands in
stark contrast to prosecutors' ability "to control a large part of the
investigative process" in most other types of federal cases. As a result,
the prosecutors are often left with evidence that is either insufficient or
irrelevant to proving a human trafficking case.79 Thus, despite limited
success since Congress passed the TVPA in 2000, significant obstacles
still prevent the effective prosecution of sex traffickers.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING
Before considering how the legislature might more effectively
combat sex trafficking, it is important to understand the relationship
between sex trafficking and the prostitution industry as a whole. To
fully consider the issue of this relationship, Section A discusses the
position of commercial sex-work advocates, who believe that
prostitution generally is a legitimate form of work that is completely
distinguishable from sex trafficking and that it should at least be
decriminalized, if not legally regulated.80 Refuting that position, Section
B examines the inherent link between the prostitution industry and the
sex trafficking industry. Finally, Section C explores the real-world
difficulties in differentiating between individuals who have chosen to
engage in prostitution of their own volition and those who have been
wrongfully enticed to enter the industry due to their vulnerabilities.
A. The Sex- Work Model: Separating Volitional Prostitution from
Forced Sex Trafficking
Sex-work advocates generally consider the prohibition on the
commercial sale of sex to infringe upon an individual's right to choice or
agency."' According to the sex-work model, those engaged in the
commercial sex industry, including prostitutes, are exercising their
77. See AMY FARRELL ET AL., supra note 71, at 199-200 (noting that "a majority of human
trafficking cases are identified and initially investigated by local law enforcement" and are referred
to federal prosecutors only after an arrest has taken place).
78. Id.
79. See id. at 200 (noting that a common complaint of federal prosecutors is that they often
receive referrals with either "little evidence" or "weak evidence").
80. See Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform
and Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1699-1702 (2010) (arguing against
the conflation of prostitution with sex trafficking); MacKinnon, supra note 22, at 272-74.
81. MacKinnon, supra note 22, at 272-73.
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agency as individuals to determine their own paths. 8 2 Supporters of this
sex-work model view the legalization or decriminalization of
prostitution as, at worst, providing women with agency, even if in
undesirable situations. 83
Just as those in favor of the sex-work model oppose the
criminalization of prostitution, they also oppose the conflation of the
commercial sex industry generally, including prostitution, with sex
trafficking.84 On the broadest level, many sex-work advocates view sex
trafficking and prostitution as two separate, unconnected industries. In
this conceptualization of the industries, all those who engage in
prostitution do so of their own volition. In contrast, a victim of sex
trafficking has not made a choice to participate in the industry-this
victim is there fully against his or her will.
Supporting their view of separate sex trafficking and
prostitution industries, sex-work advocates assert that equating
prostitution with sex trafficking fails to recognize the possibility of a
woman's choice to engage in commercial sex work.85 Further, given that
far more females engage in prostitution than males, commercial sex-
work advocates posit that equating prostitution and sex trafficking
reinforces gender-based stereotypes of females as weak, vulnerable
individuals with no agency to choose their own paths.86
B. Why Prostitution and Sex Trafficking Are Inherently Linked
Commercial sex-work advocates certainly express some valid
concerns. But even if these advocates properly view prostitution and sex
trafficking as distinct industries, there is still a definite link between
82. Id.
83. See Chuang, supra note 80, at 1702 (noting that while the commodification of sex might
be undesirable in an ideal world, it is better to recognize reality and legitimize a woman's choice
"between selling sex and letting [herselfJ or [her] children go hungry"). In a best-case scenario, the
sex-work model provides gender equality by liberating women from gender stereotypes. Id. at
1670. As Catharine MacKinnon describes it, "[t]he agentic actors, sex workers, most of them
women, control the sexual interaction, are compensated for what is usually expected from women
for free, and have independent lives and anonymous sex with many partners-behaviors usually
monopolized by men, hence liberating for women." MacKinnon, supra note 22, at 273.
84. See, e.g., Chuang, supra note 80, at 1699-702 (discussing the "discursive and practical
perils" of equating sex work generally with sex trafficking).
85. See id. at 1699 (arguing that equating prostitutes and sex trafficking victims "sweeps
any exercise of agency by the putative victim under a totalizing narrative of victimization that
refuses to engage in any marking of relative control or freedom").
86. See id. at 1699-700, 1710-11.
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the two industries. As several "abolitionists" 87 have pointed out,8 8 on
both a theoretical and a practical level, as the commercial sex industry
goes, so goes the sex trafficking industry.89
On the theoretical side, a series of causal chains provides the
link between prostitution and sex trafficking. 90 First, any form of
commercial transaction for sex leads to an increase in market demand
for sexual services.91 This demand for sexual services creates a "profit
motive" that encourages individuals, including traffickers, to provide
commercial sexual services.92 Finally, given the nature of the industry
and established practices, traffickers often resort to exploitive tactics in
order to find sex partners to meet this demand.93 Thus, as the
prostitution industry as a whole goes, so goes sex trafficking. 94
While this supply-and-demand theory is susceptible to some
criticisms,9 5 evidence supporting this model shows that sex trafficking
87. Note that the term "abolitionists" is often used in scholarship to define those individuals
who seek to combat sex trafficking by eliminating the commercial sex industry as a whole. See,
e.g., id. at 1664-69; Michelle Madden Dempsey, Sex Trafficking and Criminalization: In Defense
of Feminist Abolitionism, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 1729, 1730-31 (2010).
88. While abolitionists come in a wide range of forms and have different motivating concerns,
they generally share a desire to abolish both sex trafficking and prostitution. See Dempsey, supra
note 87, at 1740-45 (providing thorough discussion of various motivations of abolitionists).
89. See, e.g., id. at 1752-53 (detailing the theoretical link between the purchase of sex and
sex trafficking); see also Melissa Farley, Prostitution, Trafficking, and Cultural Amnesia: What We
Must Not Know in Order to Keep the Business of Sexual Exploitation Running Smoothly, 18 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 109, 136-37 (2006) (noting that the legalization of prostitution in Australia has
worsened conditions for many prostitutes and increased sex trafficking); MacKinnon, supra note
22, at 304 (noting that where prostitution has been legalized, trafficking has increased
dramatically).
90. See Dempsey, supra note 87, at 1752-53.
91. Id. at 1752.
92. Id. at 1753.
93. Id.
94. See id. ("[B]y purchasing sex, one encourages conduct by traffickers and pimps that is
often harmful to prostituted people.")
95. For instance, one might argue that individuals willfully choosing to engage in
prostitution would rise to meet this increased demand and could do so at a lower cost to the
consumer given the smaller risk premium compared to that faced by traffickers and pimps coercing
individuals into prostitution. However, even this criticism is susceptible to critique. First, the cost
of sex with a willful prostitute can often be higher than with a coerced prostitute, and most johns
seeking sex are willing to overlook any possibility of coercion in exchange for a lower price. See,
e.g., GARY A. HAUGEN & VICTOR BOUTROS, THE LOCUST EFFECT: WHY THE END OF POVERTY
REQUIRES THE END OF VIOLENCE 58 (2014) ("The vast majority of customers just want the sex, and
they are very willing to ignore and deny the coercion that makes it possible for them to purchase
the cheap sex . . . ."); Grace Chang & Kathleen Kim, Reconceptualizing Approaches to Human
Trafficking: New Directions and Perspectives from the Field(s), 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 317, 331-32
(2007) (noting that "john schools," intended to educate men about the negative effects of
prostitution on women, often do not succeed in stopping men from purchasing sex). Second, while
pimping and trafficking almost always carry greater sentences, far more prostitutes are arrested
than any of the individuals in the commercial sex industry's support structure, such as johns,
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increases substantially in jurisdictions that legally regulate or
decriminalize prostitution-related activities.96 Specifically, an increase
in sex trafficking has unequivocally accompanied the legalization of
prostitution in the Netherlands, Germany, and Victoria, a state in
Australia.97 For instance, from 1996 to 2003, as the entire prostitution
industry in the Netherlands grew, the number of children in
prostitution increased by eleven thousand.98 This contradicts the sex-
work model's conception of sex trafficking and prostitution as two
unconnected industries. Rather, the theoretical and practical evidence
that supply and demand provides suggests that, at the very least, the
two industries are linked. Thus, even if each person who engages in
prostitution does so completely of his or her own free will and each
victim of sex trafficking had no choice whatsoever in entering the
industry, the growth or decline of the sex trafficking industry is linked
to the growth or decline of the prostitution industry as a whole.
In contrast to the complete decriminalization of prostitution
discussed above, in 1999, Sweden took a different approach to
decriminalization that did not trigger increases in sex trafficking.99 The
new Swedish laws made it legal for a prostitute to sell sexual services,
but the laws continued to prohibit the purchase of sexual services,
traditional pimping, and sex trafficking. 10 Although this change in the
law has received some criticisms, 101 it has served as an effective
restriction to sex trafficking in Sweden, where trafficking is
"substantially smaller in scale than in other comparable countries."1 02
pimps, and traffickers. See, e.g., DONNAM. HUGHES, FACT SHEET, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING AND
PROSTITUTION IN THE UNITED STATES 3-4 (2005) (citing several studies showing extreme
disparities between arrests of johns and arrests of prostitutes).
96. MacKinnon, supra note 22, at 304. This is different from the Swedish model, discussed
infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text, because here not only is the act of prostitution legal,
but so are acts of purchasing sex and general pandering (without force, fraud, or coercion, of
course). See id. at 301-04 (comparing Swedish model with legalization models in other countries).
97. Id. at 304.
98. JULIE BINDEL & LIz KELLY, A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF RESPONSES TO PROSTITUTION
IN FOUR COUNTRIES: VICTORIA, AUSTRALIA; IRELAND; THE NETHERLANDS; AND SWEDEN 15 (2003).
99. See Heather Monasky, Note, On Comprehensive Prostitution Reform: Criminalizing the
Trafficker and the Trick, but Not the Victim-Sweden's Sexk6pslagen in America, 37 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1989, 2012-17 (2011).
100. Id. at 2012-13.
101. See id. at 2030-33.
102. Statens Offentliga Utredningar [SOU] 2010:49 F6rbud mot kop av sexuell tjAnst. En
utviirdering 1999-2008 [Prohibition of the Purchase of Sexual Services] [government report series]
(Swed.), at 37, available at http://www.regeringense/content/1/c6/14/91/42/ed1c91ad.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/B4BR-PPXT. Additionally, the shift in the focus of enforcement from prostitutes
to johns, pimps, and traffickers has reportedly resulted in a decrease in demand for sexual services,
as potential johns are more concerned with the increased risk of criminal punishment. See id. at
38.
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Thus, even if one accepts sex-work advocates' proposition that
prostitution and sex trafficking are two fully distinguishable industries,
the differences between the Swedish model's effects on sex trafficking
and those of more generalized legalization of prostitution further
underscore that the industries are unquestionably linked.
C. The Blurred Line of Consent Between Sex Trafficking
and Prostitution
In addition to this link between sex trafficking and prostitution,
the distinction between individuals in prostitution and sex trafficking
victims is, at best, blurred. Studies of prostitution grounded in the
practical reality of a prostitute's daily life suggest that, rather than
being a completely distinct industry from sex trafficking, prostitution
may often involve coercive elements. 103 Evidence indicates that the
majority of prostitutes do not enter the prostitution industry of their
own free will 04 but instead become prostitutes due to a variety of
vulnerabilities that both pimps and traffickers exploit. 105 It appears
that prostitutes and sex trafficking victims do not make up two distinct
categories, as sex-work advocates suggest, but rather, most individuals
involved in the commercial sale of sex exist along a continuum, with
varying levels of consent.
Poverty and economic vulnerability are the most prevalent
reasons individuals find themselves in prostitution.1 0 6 But in addition
to the sheer need for money caused by his or her financial situation, an
individual's impoverished status can lead to more questions about
whether he or she has truly consented to engaging in prostitution. 0 7
103. See, e.g., JODY RAPHAEL & DEBORAH L. SHAPIRO, SISTERS SPEAK OUT: THE LIVES AND
NEEDS OF PROSTITUTED WOMEN IN CHICAGO 5 (2002) (noting at least seventy-five percent of
prostitutes who gave some share of their profits to a pimp feared they would be harmed if they
stopped giving that share); JANICE G. RAYMOND & DONNA M. HUGHES, COAL. AGAINST
TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN, SEX TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 63-64 (2001),
available at http://www.uri.edu/artscilwms/hughes/sex-traffus.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
QXM43-JL65 (noting that eighty percent of prostitutes surveyed experienced sexual assault by their
pimps, eighty-five percent experienced psychological abuse by their pimps, and ninety percent
reported verbal threats by pimps); Melissa Farley, Prostitution Is Sexual Violence, PSYCHIATRIC
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2004, available at http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/prostitution-sexual-violence,
archived at http://perma.cclU2X2-T8XR ("Instead of the question, 'Did she voluntarily consent to
prostitution?' the more relevant question would be, 'Did she have real alternatives to prostitution
for survival?' ").
104. See Farley, supra note 89, at 118.
105. See Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 21, at 1023-25.
106. See MacKinnon, supra note 22, at 276 ("Urgent financial need is the most frequent reason
mentioned by people in prostitution for being in the sex trade.").
107. See HAUGEN & BOUTROS, supra note 95, at 61 ("The poor are especially susceptible to
these schemes of deception because the desperation of their economic situation makes
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Indeed, those recruiting individuals into the commercial sex industry
often take advantage of the fact that "poverty frequently also means
[potential recruits] are more likely to be less educated, more naive, less
sophisticated, deferential to people of higher status, and less
accustomed to asserting themselves."10 8  Accordingly, these
characteristics may indicate that the individual did not truly
understand the industry he or she was entering, that the individual
never affirmatively manifested consent, or that other undue persuasion
may have played a role in the individual's entrance into the industry.
In addition to poverty, the average age of individuals entering
prostitution creates doubt about whether an individual had the capacity
to truly consent to entering prostitution. 109 Given that many prostitutes
enter the industry as minors,110 that minors cannot legally consent to
sexual acts,111 and that it is extremely difficult for an individual to leave
prostitution once involved, 112 most adults who entered prostitution as
minors are likely not in the industry truly of their own volition. 113
Because these vulnerabilities contribute to an individual's lack
of full consent in entering prostitution, the distinction between
consensual prostitution and sex trafficking is unclear.1 14 Ultimately,
while there are legitimate concerns regarding fully equating all
prostitution with sex trafficking, the demonstrable connection between
the two industries suggests that any effective sex trafficking legislation
may also implicate prostitution.
them . . . more willing to suspend their disbelief, set aside their suspicions, and take greater
risks.").
108. Id.
109. See MacKinnon, supra note 22, at 278.
110. See, e.g., RAPHAEL & SHAPIRO, supra note 103, at 4 (noting that, of 222 prostitutes
surveyed in Chicago, sixty-two percent began before the age of eighteen); MIMI H. SILBERT & AYALA
M. PINES, Entrance into Prostitution, 13 YOUTH & Soc'Y 471, 483 (1982) (noting that, of two
hundred prostitutes surveyed in San Francisco, sixty-two percent began before the age of sixteen
and seventy-eight percent began before the age of eighteen).
111. See, e.g., Annitto, supra note 55, at 31 (noting that "statutory rape laws preclude legal
consent to sexual activity" for minors).
112. See MacKinnon, supra note 22, at 306 ("Most adult women in prostitution are first
prostituted as girls and are just never able to escape."); see also RAPHAEL & SHAPIRO, supra note
103, at 5 (noting at least seventy-five percent of prostitutes who gave a cut of their profits to a
pimp felt they would be harmed if they stopped giving that cut).
113. MacKinnon, supra note 22, at 278-79.
114. Indeed, this blurring is highlighted by the U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, which defines trafficking as including "the abuse of power or of a position
of vulnerability." Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, supra note 8,
at art. 3(a). Given the vulnerabilities that contribute to many individuals' "choices" to enter
prostitution, the distinction between the reasons for entering the two industries becomes less clear.
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IV. THE PROBLEM OF PIMPING
A. The Blurred Line Between Pimps and Sex Traffickers
When dealing with an issue as complex as sex trafficking, there
is not a singular "quick fix."115 Although Sweden's method of
criminalizing the acts of pimps and johns while decriminalizing the
actual sale of sex offers an intriguing possibility to fight sex
trafficking,1 16 federalism concerns and the politically controversial
nature of such a law make it highly unlikely that the U.S. government
would be able to implement Sweden's model. Scholars have made
various other suggestions for improvements, including more training
for law enforcement officials," 7 the establishment of a safe harbor for
minor victims," 8 and better coordination between federal and state law
enforcement.1 19 However, rather than broadly considering a variety of
possible issues and solutions, this Note seeks to mitigate the difficulty
of successfully prosecuting sex trafficking cases under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591120 by addressing one particular type of actor in the commercial
sex industry-the pimp.
According to Black's Law Dictionary, a pimp is "[a] person who
solicits customers for a prostitute, [usually] in return for a share of the
prostitute's earnings."121 In reality, however, a pimp functions as far
more than just an agent for a prostitute-frequently, a pimp will also
establish relationships with vulnerable individuals and work to recruit
them into prostitution.1 2 2
The similar methods that pimps and sex traffickers use indicate
that the prostitution and sex trafficking industries are not as different
as some believe. Recall that many sex-work advocates view consent or
lack of consent by individuals entering the commercial sex business as
mutually exclusive pathways into the industry-an individual either
115. See HAUGEN & BOUTROS, supra note 95, at 60 (noting that sex trafficking is an extremely
complex issue and that relatively little is actually known about traffickers).
116. See, e.g., Bindel & Kelly, supra note 98, at 77 (noting that Sweden is now less attractive
to traffickers and that only "between 200 and 500 women are trafficked into Sweden in recent
years," compared with an estimated ten thousand to fifteen thousand into Finland); Statens
Offentliga Utredningar [SOU], supra note 102, at 37.
117. See, e.g., Chac6n, supra note 47, at 3038 (noting the general failure of the TVPA to
encourage adequate training of local law enforcement officers).
118. See, e.g., Annitto, supra note 55, at 58, 62.
119. See Heiges, supra note 23, at 438-39 (arguing for greater federal law enforcement
involvement to address discrepancies between state and federal enforcement models).
120. See, e.g., Chac6n, supra note 47, at 3019-20.
121. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 1333.
122. See, e.g., Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 21, at 1023-29.
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fully consents to entering the commercial sex industry as a prostitute
or does not consent at all and is forced into the industry as a sex
trafficking victim. Likewise, many view the statuses of third-party
actors (i.e., pimps and sex traffickers) involved in the commercial sex
industry as mutually exclusive as well: either these individuals are sex
traffickers, reviled by the public for their abhorrent crimes, or they are
common pimps, whose actions are technically crimes but go unpunished
on every level of the criminal justice system.12 3
Section 1591 embodies such a view of third-party actors involved
in the commercial sex industry. Individuals who cause another person
"to engage in a commercial sex act" by means of "force, fraud, or
coercion" or where the person is a minor are considered sex traffickers,
deserving a minimum sentence of either ten or fifteen years. 124 In
contrast, individuals who cause an adult individual to engage in a
commercial sex act by means less than force, fraud, or coercion,
including by exploiting any of the many vulnerabilities often found in
prostitutes, are considered common pimps, left to be dealt with at the
discretion of state or local law enforcement. 125
However, laws against pimping are underenforced. Although all
states criminalize pimping, 126 studies in Boston and Chicago reported
that less than one percent of prostitution-related arrests were for
pimping. 127 These studies, though providing only a limited sample,
support the scholarly perception that local law enforcement agencies
generally spend very little time addressing the problem of pimping
when enforcing prostitution laws.128 Accordingly, the conception of
pimps and sex traffickers as mutually exclusive groups leads to
substantially different treatment by law enforcement when the two
groups' behavior is not substantially different. This asymmetry leaves
condemnable behavior unpunished.
In contrast to this dichotomous view of third-party actors in the
commercial sex industry, this Note proposes that the reprehensibility
(and thus culpability) of the third-party actors' conduct falls along a
123. For more discussion of the underenforcement of pimping laws, see infra notes 126-28
and accompanying text.
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2012).
125. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 28, at 2.
126. See generally US Federal and State Prostitution Laws and Related Punishments,
PROCON.ORG, http://prostitution.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourcelD=000119, archived at
http://perma.cc/AZM6-K354 (last updated Mar. 15, 2010) (summarizing criminal punishments for
pimping in each state).
127. DONNA M. HUGHES, THE DEMAND FOR VICTIMS OF SEX TRAFFICKING 38-39 (2005),
available at http://www.uri.edulartscilwms/hughes/demand for-victims.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/WWB4-LAZY.
128. See, e.g., Heiges, supra note 23, at 442-43.
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continuum based on the degree of coercive and exploitative conduct
used. On one end of this spectrum are the actions of a "benevolent"
pimp-someone who acts as an agent for a prostitute by scheduling
appointments with clients, ensuring clients pay the promised price, and
protecting the prostitute from the various dangers encountered in the
course of prostitution, in exchange for a fair portion of the prostitute's
profits. 12 9 At the other end of the spectrum is the general public's image
of a sex trafficker-a sensationalized criminal who abducts or kidnaps
victims and chains them up to be sold for sexual services. 130
However, third-party actors in the commercial sex industry
typically do not engage in actions at one end of the continuum or the
other but rather in actions with a degree of reprehensibility between
these two extremes. In fact, in the U.S. commercial sex industry, many
individuals who have been convicted as "sex traffickers" are actually
pimps whose actions rose beyond a certain level of exploitation,
supporting this Note's view that, despite the traditional taxonomy,
these actors cannot be neatly divided into two distinct categories. 131
Pimps exploit their victims in a variety of ways. First, pimps
recruiting prostitutes often seek out individuals who are vulnerable in
any of the ways discussed in Part III.C.132 As one pimp explained, "[i]t
doesn't matter to a pimp what hoes' weaknesses are, so long as they
have them. Then he uses those to his advantage. Weakness is the best
trait a person can find in someone they want to control." 133
Pimps typically recruit these vulnerable individuals through use
of persuasive tactics that do not rise to the level of the force, fraud, or
coercion required by § 1591.134 In describing the role of force in pimping,
129. This accords with the historical conceptualization of pimps. See Evelina Giobbe, An
Analysis of Individual, Institutional, and Cultural Pimping, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 33, 33-38
(1993) (citing BEN L. REITMAN, THE SECOND OLDEST PROFESSION (1931)).
130. See, e.g., TAKEN (EuropaCorp. 2008).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 770 F.3d 556, 563, 575 (7th Cir. 2014) (affirming
conviction of self-labeled pimp for sex trafficking); United States v. Pringler, 765 F.3d 445, 448,
456 (5th Cir. 2014) (same); United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1278, 1291 (11th Cir. 2014)
(same).
132. See supra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
133. PIMPIN' KEN & KAREN HUNTER, PIMPOLOGY: THE 48 LAWS OF THE GAME 22 (2008).
134. See Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization ofAnti-Trafficking Programs: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 77 (2007) (statement of Dorchen A. Leidholdt,
Director, Sanctuary for Families' Center for Battered Women's Legal Services), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg38640/html/CHRG-110hhrg38640.htm, archived at
http://perma.cc/NAK8-2LG2 (discussing the difficulties of prosecuting under the force, fraud, or
coercion standard because sex traffickers "need not resort to [such means] because their victims
are so vulnerable, terrified, or traumatized that such conduct isn't necessary to obtain their
victims' submission"); see also Hersh, supra note 70, at 262 (noting that "most victims do not self-
identify as 'trafficking victims' ").
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one former pimp said, "If your thing is to physically intimidate bitches
into trickin [sic] for you then you're not a pimp, you're a thug or a
gangster." 135 Instead, pimps often use tactics that, on the surface, seem
to fall short of criminal behavior. One former pimp described pimping
as a "mind game," labeling a "true pimp" as "someone who gets a bitch
to love her pimp [and] need her pimp," such that "she can leave at any
time if she wanted to but she won't cause [sic] life without her pimp is
the darkest place in the world for a bitch." 13 6 Another pimp explained
that "[u]nless [the prostitute] feels love for you, a ho's not going to give
you her money for eight- and ten-year stretches." 137 These pimps exploit
the desire for loving relationships to recruit individuals to enter
prostitution. As one prostitute explained:
Most hoes are lost little girls who have been neglected growing up, now living in a woman's
body. Hoes don't do this because they enjoy turning tricks, most hoes don't even like sex.
They believe a pimp will give them the love and care they didn't have growing up.. .. In
her mind a pimp is a ho's man . 138
Accordingly, pimps' use of seduction tactics to recruit individuals
into the commercial sex industry is a prime example of the type of
behavior that falls into this grey area of criminal culpability. While not
using means that would constitute force, fraud, or coercion, the pimp is
intentionally exploiting the individual's vulnerabilities, leading that
individual to enter the industry without true volition. Interestingly,
such exploitation could potentially satisfy the Palermo Protocol's
definition of "trafficking in persons," which prohibits the "abuse of
power or of a position of vulnerability . . . for the purpose of
exploitation." 1 3 9
Even where a pimp engages in more direct tactics to gain and
maintain control over a prostitute, these tactics often fall short of what
the law considers force, fraud, or coercion. For example, one common
practice is for pimps to manage all financial matters for their
prostitutes. 140 The prostitute will give the pimp all of her earnings, and
the pimp will play the role of provider by paying bills (including rent),
buying clothes, and providing food. 141 In doing so, the pimp ensures that
135. How to Be a Pimp: Learn & Understand Pimping 2.0, PIMPFEET.COM, http://
www.pimpfeet.com, archived at http://perma.cclW7TF-TH4S (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).
136. Id.
137. PIMPIN' KEN & HUNTER, supra note 133, at 77.
138. Id. at 77-78.
139. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, supra note 8, at art.
3(a) (emphasis added).




he always controls all of the prostitute's earnings. 142 Thus, even if the
prostitute wanted to leave the pimp, she would have to do so with only
the clothes on her back-penniless, homeless, and likely jobless. 143
Another tactic pimps use to maintain control is moving their
prostitutes around to different cities.144 By constantly moving a
prostitute, the pimp is able to keep the prostitute off-balance and
dependent on the pimp.1 45 Rather than becoming comfortable with a
location and thinking she can function without the pimp, the prostitute
has to depend on the pimp for information on where to find clients and
who can be trusted.146 As one pimp explained, "[w]ithout strong ties to
a place, family, or loved ones, [people] can be easily manipulated and
controlled. If you can keep a person off-balance, they'll be too busy
trying to regain stability to try to unbalance you."1 47
Ultimately, as this discussion shows, most pimps do not engage
in conduct at either end of the reprehensibility continuum. Rather, most
of their conduct falls somewhere in the grey area between "benevolent"
pimping and forced sexual slavery. Such actions could be classified as
sex trafficking under the general definitions that the TVPA1 48 and the
Palermo Protocol provide.1 49 However, the dichotomous view of the
TVPA's criminal prohibition on sex trafficking and the lack of
significant enforcement of pimping laws at the state level allow pimps
to operate with effective impunity.
B. An Attempt at Change: H.R. 3887
Responding to the prosecutorial difficulties with the force, fraud,
or coercion standard-and attempting to address the problem of
pimping in the commercial sex industry discussed above-the House of
Representatives passed H.R. 3887 in 2007 to increase prosecutors'
ability to target both pimps and sex traffickers who might otherwise go
unpunished. 5 0 Although the bill ultimately failed in the Senate,
consideration of what the bill proposed and the criticisms it faced
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 83-85.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 85.
148. See 22 U.S.C. § 7102(10) (2012) (defining "sex trafficking").
149. See Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, supra note 8, at
art. 3(a) (defining "[t]rafficking in persons").
150. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2007, H.R.
3887, 110th Cong. (2007), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-bill/
3887, archived at http://perma.cc/9YEF-HXP8.
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informs what type of legislation might be implemented in the future to
deal with the problem of pimping.
While the bill contained many provisions aimed at eliminating
human trafficking generally, 15 1 § 221(f) of the bill created a new offense
of "Sex Trafficking," which read:
Whoever knowingly, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce ... persuades, induces,
or entices any individual to engage in prostitution for which any person can be charged
with -n nffPn- nr nttempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 10 years, or both. 1 52
Most notably, conviction under this new offense did not require that
traffickers of adult victims had used force, fraud, or coercion, unlike
conviction under § 1591.153 The bill also retitled § 1591 as a new offense
of "Aggravated Sex Trafficking" and shifted it from Chapter 77 of Title
18 (Peonage, Slavery, and Trafficking in Persons) to Chapter 117 of
Title 18 (Transportation for Illegal Sexual Activity and Related
Crimes), which contained the Mann Act and the new offense of "Sex
Trafficking." 154
However, after the House passed H.R. 3887, a number of third
parties, including the DOJ and sex-work advocates, voiced opposition
to the bill.155 First, and perhaps most importantly, many opponents of
H.R. 3887 viewed the new offense for "Sex Trafficking" 15 6 as an
unconstitutional intrusion into the states' police power, believing that
neither the Thirteenth Amendment nor the Commerce Clause
supported such federal regulation. 15 7 Second, the DOJ opposed the bill
as an unnecessary alteration to its "successful anti-trafficking
strategy."15 8 The DOJ claimed that such legislation would "detract from
the investigation and prosecution of existing federal [human
151. See Lindsay Strauss, Note, Adult Domestic Trafficking and the William Wilberforce
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 495, 523-25
(2010).
152. H.R. 3887 § 221(f) (as referred in Senate, Dec. 5, 2007).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 1591.
154. H.R. 3887 § 221.
155. See Strauss, supra note 151, at 523.
156. H.R. 3887 § 221(f).
157. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 28, at 2 (noting that pimping and
pandering "have always been prosecuted at the state or local level"); Walsh & Grossman, supra
note 28, at 5, 7-9 (arguing that authority for the bill could not be based on either the Thirteenth
Amendment or the Commerce Clause); Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, Principle Deputy
Assistant Att'y Gen., to The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., Chairman of House Comm. on the
Judiciary (Nov. 9, 2007) (on file with author) ("[Plandering, pimping, and prostitution-related
offenses have historically been prosecuted at the state or local level."). However, as discussed
below, these objections were likely unfounded. See infra Part V.B (analyzing Commerce Clause
justification of a similar statute).
158. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 28, at 1.
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trafficking] crimes" by draining resources from existing task forces
while stepping into an area of law enforcement traditionally left to the
states-the enforcement of prostitution laws.159 Finally, sex-work
advocates criticized the bill both as improperly equating all prostitution
with sex trafficking160 and as assuming that no individual could choose
to engage in prostitution of his or her own will. 161 For all of these
reasons, the bill that was ultimately enacted, the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act ("TVPRA") of 2008, excluded many of
the most significant changes that H.R. 3887 had included. Most
significantly for the purposes of this Note, it eliminated the creation of
the new criminal offense for "Sex Trafficking," 1 62 leaving 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591 as the only sex trafficking-specific offense.1 63
V. A NEW APPROACH: THE CREATION OF A FEDERAL OFFENSE
FOR PIMPING
Despite H.R. 3887's death in the Senate, this Note proposes a
solution to address the same challenges of dealing with pimps that the
House attempted to remedy in the bill's initial passage. In doing so,
though, this solution also incorporates lessons that can be learned from
the criticisms H.R. 3887 faced, thus creating a refined criminal offense
that better addresses the problem of pimping and the difficulties federal
prosecutors face in trying sex trafficking cases under § 1591.
This Note proposes that Congress should create a new federal
offense for pimping by amending a part of the Mann Act-18 U.S.C.
§ 2422(a). Section A presents the new provision and explains why the
new offense is not subject to much of the criticism that was directed at
H.R. 3887. Section B then explains in depth the constitutional
foundation for such legislation.
A. The New Offense: Inducement and Enticement
A number of changes could improve the usefulness of federal sex
trafficking legislation. However, concerns such as federalism164 and
159. Id. at 1-2.
160. See Letter from Alexandria House et. al. to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary et al. (Jan. 23, 2008), available at http://napawf.org/wp-content/uploads/
2009/working/pdfs/TVPRA letter%20_1-23-08.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/FZ9F-AZZD.
161. See Kaigh, supra note 27, at 157-58.
162. See Strauss, supra note 151, at 526-27.
163. See Heiges, supra note 23, at 446-47.
164. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the
people.").
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resource limitations, 165 discussed in Part IV.B, limit the steps that
Congress can take. Despite these limitations, Congress should create a
new federal offense to address pimping while retaining the offense for
sex trafficking in 18 U.S.C. § 1591. The purposes of the federal sex
trafficking legal regime would best be served by Congress amending 18
U.S.C. § 2422(a) of the Mann Act.166 The amended statute should be
retitled "Inducement and Enticement" and should read:
Whoever knowingly, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or in any territory or possession
of the United States, persuades, induces, or entices an individual to engage in a
commercial sex act with a third party, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both. 167
This Note proposes such specific language to ensure that the
statute fills the current gap in the sex trafficking legal regime by
addressing the problem of pimping. First, by using the phrase "in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce" instead of requiring travel in
interstate or foreign commerce, the new federal offense will provide
prosecutors with an additional tool to use against those pimps and
traffickers of adults who neither transport individuals across state lines
nor employ the force, fraud, or coercion that 18 U.S.C. § 1591
requires. 168 Further, instead of terms such as "procuring,"'6 9
"pandering,"1 70 "promoting prostitution,"1 7 1 or "profiting from a
prostitute's earnings"172 that are used in state antipimping laws,
keeping the original Mann Act's "persuades, induces, [or] entices"
language best serves the goals of the new federal offense. 173 The
"persuades, induces, [or] entices" language avoids the potentially
unduly narrow interpretation of a term such as "procuring."17 4 Instead,
165. See Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, supra note 157 (opposing passage of H.R. 3887
because of lack of resources).
166. 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (2012).
167. For comparison, as it currently stands, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a) reads:
Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual to travel in
interstate or foreign commerce . . . to engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity
for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
168. 18 U.S.C. § 1591.
169. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-5602 (2014).
170. E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.33 (West 2014).
171. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.15 (McKinney 2014).
172. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 266h(a) (West 2014).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a).
174. See, e.g., MODEL STATE PROVISIONS ON PIMPING, PANDERING, AND PROSTITUTION (2014),
available at http://www.justice.gov/olp/model-state-criminal-provisions.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/PWY2-YV6J (including offense of "procuring" that makes it unlawful "to receive any
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the Mann Act language provides prosecutors with a more flexible
offense that can supplement existing sex trafficking legislation. In
addition, the amended statute does not use the term "coercion," which
appears in the original Mann Act, to help distinguish the new offense
of "Inducement and Enticement" from the offense of sex trafficking in§ 1591.175
Although this provision is similar to H.R. 3887, several key
differences help alleviate concerns that were raised about the proposed
"Sex Trafficking" offense found in § 221(f) of the bill. First, the new
statute's title addresses the concern that H.R. 3887 equated all
prostitution-related crime with sex trafficking.176 The new offense
would no longer be titled "Sex Trafficking,"1 77 thereby dispelling any
possible conflation of sex trafficking with prostitution based upon the
title of the statute. Additionally, the amended statute clarifies that the
offense is only intended to punish a third party-a pimp who causes an
individual to engage in prostitution-thus further delineating the
difference between those engaging in prostitution and those engaging
in pimping. 178
Of course, the proposed amendment is still susceptible to some
critiques from sex-work advocates. For example, clearly the amendment
does not decriminalize prostitution. However, the amendment does not
change the status quo of the legality of prostitution, allowing states and
localities to retain their individual laws. Furthermore, it could
encourage local law enforcement agencies to shift their primary targets
under prostitution laws from prostitutes to pimps, as discussed further
later in this Section.
Additionally, although sex-work advocates could argue that such
legislation harms prostitutes because some pimps actually act in a way
that benefits prostitutes-the so-called benevolent pimp discussed
previouslyl 79-two other considerations outweigh these concerns. First,
money or other thing of value for or on account of arranging for or causing any individual to engage
in prostitution").
175. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (criminalizing use of coercion in sex trafficking).
176. See, e.g., Kaigh, supra note 27, at 169 ("The equation of prostitution and sex
trafficking . . . would be unacceptable."); Letter from Alexandria House et. al., supra note 160
(contesting equation of prostitution with sex trafficking).
177. See H.R. 3887, 110th Cong. § 221 (1st Sess. 2007) (creating new offense of "Sex
Trafficking").
178. Many state statutes use the phrase "to become a prostitute" where this proposed statute
uses "to engage in an act of prostitution." E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.15 (McKinney 2014). This
Note thoughtfully and deliberately rejects the state language because criminalizing only behavior
that causes an individual to become a prostitute places undue focus on the initial decision to work
in the sex industry, rather than on each act of prostitution.
179. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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because many pimps are not of this benevolent nature, but rather seek
to exploit prostitutes for the pimps' own gain, it seems unlikely that the
net impact on all prostitutes would be negative.180 Second, even if one
were to believe that all pimps act benevolently to their prostitutes, the
linkage between the prostitution and sex trafficking industries suggests
that measures seeking to limit the prostitution industry broadly may
be legitimately necessary to combat sex trafficking. 18 1
Finally, one particular concern raised by opponents of H.R. 3887
should be addressed: resource diversion. One of the DOJ's primary
arguments against H.R. 3887 was that it would force federal law
enforcement to become a vice squad, needlessly diverting the limited
federal resources devoted to combating sex trafficking to the
enforcement of common prostitution laws. However, the proposed
offense of "Inducement and Enticement" likely would not be
detrimental to federal sex trafficking enforcement but would instead
aid in the fight against sex trafficking.
First, the proposed offense of "Inducement and Enticement" is
narrower in scope than H.R. 3887's proposed offense for "Sex
Trafficking." Although one critique of the "Sex Trafficking" offense was
that it could have been interpreted in a way that criminalized the
actions of not just pimps, but also prostitutes and johns,182 the language
of this Note's proposal is tailored to preclude such an interpretation.
H.R. 3887's proposed "Sex Trafficking" offense made it a crime for an
individual to "persuade[], induce[ ], or entice[] any individual to engage
in prostitution." 183 While it is unclear whether the House intended for
this statute to make the actual sale or purchase of sexual services a
federal crime, statements that the DOJ's Office of Legal Policy released
in response to the bill indicated that they believed it to include such
offenses.184 Such an interpretation would have made the DOJ
responsible for enforcing a broad law covering all prostitution-related
180. See supra notes 132-47 and accompanying text.
181. See supra Part III.B.
182. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 28 (noting that the bill would make the DOJ
responsible "for coordinating and prosecuting all prostitution cases within the United States");
Letter from Alexandria House et. al., supra note 160 (expressing concern that the DOJ would be
able to prosecute almost any prostitution-related offense, including for the actual sale of sex).
183. H.R. 3887, 110th Cong. § 221 (1st Sess. 2007).
184. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 28. Such a position is further supported by the
Office of Legal Policy in its Model State Provisions on Pimping, Pandering, and Prostitution, which
defines "prostitution" as "a sexual act or contact with another person in return for giving or
receiving a fee or a thing of value." MODEL STATE PROVISIONS ON PIMPING, PANDERING, AND
PROSTITUTION, supra note 174. Accordingly, criminalizing persuading, inducing, or enticing an
individual to engage in prostitution, as defined by the Model State Provisions, could include
prostitutes who talked johns into the purchase of sexual services.
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acts. In contrast, this Note's proposed offense of "Inducement and
Enticement" only criminalizes persuading, inducing, or enticing "an
individual to engage in a commercial sex act with a third party." The
use of "a third party" in this manner thus only criminalizes the actions
of individuals acting as pimps-either by persuading an individual to
engage in the commercial sale of sexual services or by persuading
customers to bring their business to the pimp's prostitutes. Accordingly,
because the new offense would only apply to pimps and not to either
prostitutes or customers, the DOJ would bear far less responsibility
under the new offense than it would have under H.R. 3887.
Second, the mere creation of a new offense does not necessarily
mean that federal law enforcement officials must prosecute all
violations of the law. Numerous federal criminal provisions exist that
the federal government does not have the resources to stringently
enforce. 85 However, by exercising prosecutorial discretion, federal
prosecutors still effectively apply laws that are broad in scope to target
the worst offenders. For example, consider the Child Support Recovery
Act ("CSRA"), which effectively federalizes the crime of failing to pay
child support.1 86 The CSRA has often been criticized as an overly broad
piece of legislation that intrudes into areas typically left to state
regulation. 187 However, because prosecutors have exercised a great deal
of prosecutorial discretion to only prosecute the most grievous
violations that were not dealt with at the state level, the
implementation of the CSRA has actually been effective and has
allowed federal prosecutors to fill a gap left by the states' enforcement
regimes 88
Third, even if the new offense did not lead to the prosecution of
any individuals that could not have been prosecuted under § 1591, it
could provide federal prosecutors who are less experienced in
prosecuting trafficking cases with an additional tool to use in
185. One prime example of this is enforcement of federal drug crimes. Although federal drug
law is full of examples of crimes that are not enforced against all offenders, this is particularly
true of marijuana laws. As more and more states legalize marijuana for medicinal or recreational
use and dispensaries operate openly, federal prosecutors only bring cases against select
individuals. For a more complete discussion of these issues, see generally, Melanie Reid, The
Quagmire That Nobody in the Federal Government Wants to Talk About: Marijuana, 44 N.M. L.
REV. 169 (2014).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2012).
187. See Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case
Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 899-900 (2012) ("The CSRA is
frequently cited as a prime example of the kind of rampant and unprincipled federalization that
threatens the character and quality of the federal courts and unnecessarily infringes on the
prerogatives of the states.").
188. Id. at 949-56.
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prosecuting sex traffickers. Rather than only taking slam-dunk cases or
ones in which the victims were minors, 189 the new offense could allow
prosecutors to more easily bring cases against sex traffickers who
victimize adults but are more skilled at hiding their own involvement.
Even if prosecutors find a "hook" to argue force, fraud, or coercion for
pimps' actions in the grey area discussed in Part IV.A,190 many federal
prosecutors still feel the force, fraud, or coercion standard is difficult to
prove. 191 Accordingly, providing prosecutors with an additional
chargeable offense might make the average federal prosecutor more
willing to try these cases. Additionally, providing this related, lesser
offense could allow prosecutors to settle more cases against traffickers
through plea bargaining, thus allowing more cases to be brought and
increasing the number of convictions.
Finally, even if creating this new offense were to have no impact
on federal prosecutors' ability to fight sex trafficking, the federal
government merely passing this law could lead to a shift in how states
enforce prostitution laws. Although regulation of prostitution-related
crimes traditionally has been left to the states, 192 previous action by the
federal government has led states to change their regulation of the
prostitution industry.193 Historically, there was no consensus among
the states about criminalizing prostitution. 19 4 Instead, the states'
coalescence in the criminalization of prostitution only occurred after
Congress passed the Mann Act of 1910,195 which was one of the earliest
federal criminal provisions related to prostitution. 1 96 Within fifteen
years of the Mann Act's passage, every state had passed some type of
prostitution law.197 Similarly, all fifty states enacted antitrafficking
legislation within thirteen years of Congress's initial passage of the
TVPA in 2000.198 Clearly, the present situation does not fully parallel
189. See AmY FARRELL ET AL., supra note 71, at 197-99 (noting that a number of prosecutors
are willing to pursue only what are effectively "slam-dunk" cases with "smoking gun" evidence or
in which the victim was a minor).
190. See supra Part IVA.
191. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
192. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 28, at 2.
193. See Charles H. Whitebread, Freeing Ourselves from the Prohibition Idea in the Twenty-
First Century, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 235, 241-43 (2000).
194. See id. at 241-42.
195. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
196. See Whitebread, supra note 193, at 241-43.
197. Id. at 243.
198. See CHILDREN AT RISK, THE STATE OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN TEXAS (Robert Sanborn et
al. eds., 2013), available at http://childrenatrisk.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/02_The-State-of-
Human-Trafficking-in-Texas.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DGR7-LVCJ (noting that Texas was
the first state to criminalize human trafficking in 2003); Wyoming Becomes 50th State to Outlaw
Human Trafficking, supra note 17.
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these instances, as all states have already criminalized pimping in some
manner.1 99 However, in light of this precedent, Congress's mere passage
of a law criminalizing acts of pimping could encourage states to regulate
pimping more stringently. Ultimately, rather than forcing the DOJ to
superfluously invest resources in vice squads that duplicate the efforts
of state law enforcement officers-a result the DOJ worried H.R. 3887
would produce200-the new offense would strengthen the DOJ's ability
to prosecute sex traffickers and could encourage states to take more
aggressive action to combat sex trafficking.
B. The Constitutional Foundation for the New Offense
Finally, from a legal standpoint, the most significant criticism of
H.R. 3887's new federal offense for sex trafficking was that it was
unconstitutional. Critics claimed that the federal offense extended
beyond the scope of its most instinctive supporting sources, the
Thirteenth Amendment201 and the Commerce Clause. 202 However, this
constitutional concern is ill-founded: the Commerce Clause amply
supports properly designed federal offenses for sex trafficking and
pimping.
Although it would seem natural that the Thirteenth Amendment
would enable legislation relating to human trafficking, there are three
reasons to believe that Congress actually designed a number of the
TVPA's sex trafficking provisions, as well as H.R. 3887's proposed
offense of "Sex Trafficking," under the authority of the Commerce
Clause. First, specific statutory language suggests Congress viewed its
enactment of sex trafficking-related offenses, particularly 18 U.S.C.§ 1591, as an exercise of its Commerce Clause powers. Comparing
§ 1591 with another provision of the TVPA, 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (an offense
created to criminalize "Forced Labor") reveals congressional intent to
199. See US Federal and State Prostitution Laws and Related Punishments, supra note 126.
200. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 28, at 1-2; Kaigh, supra note 27, at 156-
57.
201. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
202. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power "[tlo regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes"); see, e.g., OFFICE OF
LEGAL POLICY, supra note 28, at 1 (opposing new offenses as being beyond the scope of the
Thirteenth Amendment); Walsh & Grossman, supra note 28, at 5, 7-8 (arguing that authority for
the bill could be based on neither the Thirteenth Amendment nor the Commerce Clause); Letter
from Brian A. Benczkowski, supra note 157, at 8 (opposing § 221(f) as being beyond the scope of
the Thirteenth Amendment).
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exercise commerce authority over sex trafficking. 203 Congress's use of
"in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce" as the jurisdictional
element of § 1591-in contrast to § 1589, which contains no such
reference to commerce-clearly points to its intention that the
antitrafficking statute be tied to its powers to regulate commerce. 204
Second, when providing its findings that supported enacting the TVPA,
Congress stated that "[tirafficking in persons substantially affects
interstate and foreign commerce," suggesting that Congress passed a
number of the TVPA's provisions, including § 1591, using its Commerce
Clause powers. 205 Finally, the courts of appeals have consistently
analyzed § 1591's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause,
indicating that the judiciary also views § 1591 as an exercise of
Congress's Commerce Clause powers.206
Given that § 1591 is rooted in the Commerce Clause, opponents
of H.R. 3887's proposed offense of "Sex Trafficking" contended that such
legislation would not be a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause. 207
However, while only a limited number of courts have considered
arguments that § 1591 and the TVPA generally exceed Commerce
Clause authority, these challenges have been consistently rejected.208
203. See Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1003 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (comparing
§ 1591 with § 1589). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2012) (requiring that the act of sex trafficking be
"in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce"), with 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (excluding requirement of
"in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce" as an element of the crime).
204. 18 U.S.C. § 1591. The Roe court highlighted the contrast, comparing § 1591's inclusion
of, and § 1589's exclusion of, the "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce" language to
determine that, while § 1591 was enacted under Congress's Commerce Clause powers, § 1589 was
enacted under the Thirteenth Amendment. Roe, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1003.
205. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(12).
206. See, e.g., Ditullio v. Boehm, 662 F.3d 1091, 1097 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) ("Congress enacted
[§ 1591] under its Commerce Clause powers."); United States v. Chang Da Liu, 538 F.3d 1078,
1084 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding "the commerce clause provides a constitutional basis" for Congress's
enactmentof§ 1591.); United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding § 1591
constitutional under the Commerce Clause). See generally Mattar, supra note 46, at 1277-80
(reviewing a number of constitutional challenges to the TVPA under the Commerce Clause since
the TVPA's inception).
207. See, e.g., Evans, 476 F.3d at 1178 (challenging a charge under § 1591 as an invalid
exercise of Commerce Clause power because defendant's acts were purely intrastate); Walsh &
Grossman, supra note 28, at 7-8 (arguing that the Commerce Clause does not grant Congress
authority to regulate "run-of-the-mill sex crimes" such as pimping and pandering); Jennifer
Nguyen, Note, The Three Ps of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act: Unaccompanied
Undocumented Minors and the Forgotten P in the William Wilberforce Trafficking Prevention
Reauthorization Act, 17 WASH. & LEE J. CIVILRTS. & Soc. JUST. 187,214 (2010) (noting challenges
made to H.R. 3887 on grounds it exceeded the scope of the Commerce Clause).
208. See, e.g., Evans, 476 F.3d at 1178-81 (rejecting constitutional challenges to the authority
of Congress to enact the TVPA); supra note 206 and accompanying text (citing judicial responses
to arguments that the TVPA is beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause).
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Likewise, the proposed offense would fall well within the bounds
of Congress's Commerce Clause authority. According to the Supreme
Court, as long as Congress has the authority to regulate under the
Commerce Clause, whether the underlying "motive and purpose" of the
legislation is to regulate commerce is irrelevant. 209 Specifically, as the
Court observed in Gonzales v. Raich, Congress has the power to prohibit
illicit economic activity, regardless of its rationale for doing so, as long
as it has the "hook" of the Commerce Clause.210 It is well established
that the Commerce Clause allows for congressional regulation of
activities that have a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce. 211
Of particular importance for the new offense, the substantial-
effect threshold does not have to be met by any single actor alone. 212
Instead, under Wickard v. Filburn and Raich, Congress can regulate a
purely intrastate activity if it determines that an individual's activity,
when aggregated with all other individuals' similar activities, would
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 213 Additionally, a
court need not determine whether the aggregated activities would in
fact have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 214 Rather, the
court need only consider whether Congress had a rational basis for
concluding that the aggregated activities would have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.215
In analyzing the new offense proposed by this Note, several
factors support a rational basis for concluding that aggregated acts of
pimping have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. First, the
prostitution industry as a whole, including the actions of pimps, is
209. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) ("The motive and purpose of a
regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of
which the Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts are given no control.").
210. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12-13 (2005) (noting congressional goals of the
Controlled Substance Act, the statute at issue in Raich, were "to conquer drug abuse and to control
the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances"); id. at 22 (holding that Congress
acted well within its power under the Commerce Clause "when it enacted comprehensive
legislation to regulate the interstate market in a fungible commodity").
211. E.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012); see also Darby,
312 U.S. at 119-20 ("[TPhe power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce extends to the
regulation through legislative action of activities intrastate which have a substantial effect on the
commerce or the exercise of the Congressional power over it.").
212. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) ("That appellee's own
contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the
scope of federal regulation where . . . his contribution, taken together with that of many others
similarly situated, is far from trivial.").
213. E.g., id.; Raich, 545 U.S. at 18.
214. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.
215. Id. For a discussion of factors a court should consider in determining whether Congress
had a rational basis to believe that an activity, when aggregated, would have a substantial effect
on commerce, see infra note 232 and accompanying text.
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inextricably linked to sex trafficking and thus to interstate and foreign
commerce. As discussed more fully in Part III.B, 216 the volume of the
prostitution industry as a whole is directly proportional to the volume
of sex trafficking.217 As long as the demand for and general facilitation
of prostitution are allowed to go unchecked, traffickers and abusive
pimps will continue to provide the requisite supply to meet this
demand. 218 Second, the sheer magnitude of the prostitution industry 219
suggests that even purely intrastate acts, when aggregated, can have a
substantial effect on commerce. 220 Finally, pimps often use either
instrumentalities of or items in interstate commerce to conduct their
business, which further indicates that the act of pimping affects
interstate commerce. 221
Even though Congress would have a rational basis to believe
that acts of pimping, when aggregated, would have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce, some critics would likely argue that such
federal regulation of purely intrastate activities is still
unconstitutional 222 under United States v. Morrison223 and United
States v. Lopez.224 Although both decisions broadly stand for the
principle that federal power under the Commerce Clause is not
216. Supra Part III.B.
217. Farley, supra note 89, at 142.
218. See id. at 143 (arguing that full prevention of harms such as sex trafficking and abusive
pimps requires elimination of the prostitution industry itself).
219. Margaret A. Baldwin, Pornography and the Traffic in Women: Brief on Behalf of Trudee
Able-Peterson, et. al., Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant and Intervenor-Defendants, Village
Books v. City of Bellingham, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 111, 122 (1989) (noting that over $14 billion
is spent each year in the prostitution industry (citing CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT
190 (1988))).
220. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 33 (noting the magnitude of the market for marijuana in support
of finding a rational basis for proper exercise of Commerce Clause powers).
221. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1179-80 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that
defendant's use of hotels for interstate travelers and of condoms manufactured out-of-state helped
satisfy the interstate commerce requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 1591); United States v. Pipkins, 378
F.3d 1281, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting pimps' use of landline phones, cellular phones, the
internet, and condoms manufactured out-of-state to counter defendants' argument that the RICO
statute was beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause); United States v. Paris, No. 03:06-CR-
64(CFD), 2007 WL 3124724, at *8 (D. Conn. Oct. 24, 2007) (relying on use of cellular phones, credit
cards, hotels catering to out-of-state guests, and condoms manufactured out-of-state to support
finding that actions affected interstate commerce). It should be noted that use of such items would
help satisfy the jurisdictional element of the proposed offense, just as it did in Evans, Pipkins, and
Paris.
222. See, e.g., Walsh & Grossman, supra note 28, at 7-8 (discussing examples of the Supreme
Court limiting Congress's attempts to federalize common crimes).
223. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
224. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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limitless, 225 each decision distinguishes commercial or economic
activities, which can be aggregated, from noneconomic activities, which
cannot be aggregated. 226 Subsequent jurisprudence has called this
distinction into question, suggesting that the Court may now allow
aggregation of noneconomic activities. 227 But even if this is still the
absolute test for whether activities' effects can be aggregated, the
prostitution industry is, by its very nature, commercial-it revolves
around the sale and purchase of sex. 2 2 8 Thus, the new offense for
pimping is far more similar to the statute that was upheld in Raich229
than the statutes at issue in Morrison and Lopez.230
Finally, analyzing the proposed statute under the Morrison
framework shows that a federal offense for pimping would be well
within the limits of Congress's Commerce Clause powers. 231 As the
Tenth Circuit explained in applying Morrison, courts should consider
four factors to determine whether Congress had a rational basis for
believing that an activity, when aggregated, would have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce: (1) whether the activity at issue is
"commercial or economic in nature"; (2) any jurisdictional element the
statute contains limiting the law to activities in or affecting interstate
commerce; (3) whether Congress has made express findings about the
effect of the activity on interstate commerce; and (4) the degree of
attenuation in the link between the activity and interstate commerce. 232
225. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18 ("The Constitution requires a distinction between what
is truly national and what is truly local."); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 ("(Commerce Clause] authority,
though broad, does not include the authority to regulate each and every aspect of local schools.").
226. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 ("We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may
regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on
interstate commerce."); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (noting that the statute at issue had "nothing to do
with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise").
227. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 700, 700 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (noting that Court's denial of certiorari "tacitly accepts the nullification"
of Morrison and Lopez's limitations on the Commerce Clause).
228. See Mattar, supra note 46, at 1277.
229. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
230. See id. at 25 ("Unlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated [here]
are quintessentially economic.").
231. See, e.g., United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 623 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting factors for
determining whether "the regulated activity, taken in the aggregate, would substantially affect
interstate commerce"); United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting four
relevant considerations from Morrison); Mattar, supra note 46, at 1277 (outlining four factors used
in the substantial-effect analysis).
232. E.g., United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1272 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)). The Court
in Morrison considered these same factors but in the specific context of distinguishing its decision
from Lopez's limitation on the Commerce Clause, rather than as factors to be applied generally.
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609-12.
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The new offense for pimping would satisfy each of these four
factors. First commercial sex acts are, by their very nature,
commercial. 233 Second, the proposed offense includes a jurisdictional
element limiting application of the law to acts "in or affecting interstate
or foreign commerce." 234 Third, though congressional hearings would
produce even more evidence of the effect of the prostitution industry on
interstate commerce, when Congress passed the TVPA, it indicated that
the sex industry as a whole affects interstate commerce. 235 Finally, as
discussed in Part III.B, there is a clear link between pimping and
interstate commerce. 236 Accordingly, although the states have
traditionally regulated the sex industry, creating a federal offense for
pimping would be well within Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause.
Finally, opponents might challenge the proposed amendment on
Equal Protection grounds. They could characterize the law as
unconstitutionally discriminatory-it only criminalizes what has
typically been the male-dominated sector of the sex industry, while
offering victim-relief services to the predominantly female
prostitutes. 237 However, the Supreme Court has established that even
when a law contains express gender classifications and not just a
disparate effect, discrimination is allowed where the classification
serves "important governmental objectives" and "the discriminatory
means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives." 238 Thus, while not wholly eliminating this criticism,
pimping's substantial relation to the important government interests in
combating sex trafficking and exploitation suggests that the proposed
amendment would be constitutional.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the United States has had limited success in combating
the abomination that is sex trafficking, the current structure of
233. E.g., Mattar, supra note 46, at 1277.
234. Supra note 168 and accompanying text.
235. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(2), (12) (2012) (noting link between trafficking and the sex
industry as a whole and that trafficking affects interstate and foreign commerce).
236. See supra Part III.B (discussing ways that pimps' activities affect interstate commerce
because of the increase in level of sex trafficking where pimps are active); see also United States
v. Paris, No. 03:06-CR-64(CFD), 2007 WL 3124724, at *8 (D. Conn. Oct. 24, 2007) (noting "clear
nexus" between defendant's recruitment of women to engage in commercial sex acts and interstate
commerce).
237. See generally Kaigh, supra note 27, at 158-62 (discussing problems of gender
discrimination in prostitution laws generally).
238. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1984).
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antitrafficking laws leaves undesirable gaps in its coverage.
Specifically, it fails to recognize that the line between sex trafficking
and the pimping of a prostitute is blurred. The current federal offense
for sex trafficking, 18 U.S.C. § 1591, only criminalizes sex trafficking of
adults by means of force, fraud, or coercion or of minors using any
means. However, both because the elements of force, fraud, or coercion
are extremely difficult to prove and because traffickers and pimps often
need not resort to force, fraud, or coercion due to their victims'
vulnerabilities, it is challenging for prosecutors to secure convictions in
all but the most incontrovertible of sex trafficking cases. These
prosecutorial difficulties, combined with the underenforcement of state
antipimping laws, allow many traffickers and pimps to operate with
effective impunity.
To address these issues, this Note proposes creating a new
federal offense to combat pimping. The new offense would be structured
to avoid many criticisms levied at past attempts to reform the TVPA.
Most importantly, the new offense would be well within Congress's
constitutional powers under the Commerce Clause because Congress
would have a rational basis to believe that, when aggregated, even the
intrastate actions of pimps and sex traffickers would have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. While this new offense for pimping would
certainly not singlehandedly eliminate sex trafficking in the United
States, it would provide prosecutors with a significant tool that would
allow greater flexibility in prosecuting sex traffickers and pimps.
John Elrod*
* J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Vanderbilt University Law School; B.S., 2011, Lipscomb
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CHERYL MASON, Adjunct Professor of Law; Vice President, Litigation, Hospital Corporation of America
(HCA)
JOSEPH MCCARTY, Adjunct Professor of Law
FRANCISCO MUSSNICH, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Partner, Barbosa, Miissnich & Aragao Advogados
WILLIAM L. NORTON III, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings
JAMES A. OVERBY, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Bass, Berry & Sims
C. MARK PICKRELL, Adjunct Professor of Law; Owner, Pickrell Law Group
STEVEN A. RILEY, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Riley Warnock & Jacobson
WOLF-GEORG RINGE, Visiting Professor of Law; Professor of Law, Copenhagen Business School; Professor of
Law, Oxford University
BRIAN D. ROARK, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Bass, Berry & Sims
BARBARA A. ROSE, Instructor in Law; Of Counsel, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz
LINDA ROSE, Adjunct Professor of Law; Founding Partner, Rose Immigration Law Firm
RICHARD G. SANDERS, Jr., Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Aaron & Sanders
PAUL T. SCHNELL, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flo n
JUSTIN SHULER, Adjunct Professor of Law; Associate, Paul Weiss
MONA SOBHANI, Law and Neuroscience Postdoctoral Research Fellow
WILLIAM M. STERN, Adjunct Professor of Law
J. GERARD STRANCH, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings
THE HONORABLE LEO E. STRINE, JR., Adjunct Professor of Law; Chief Justice, Delaware Supreme Court
CASEY SUMMAR, Adjunct Professor of Law; Executive Director, Arts & Business Counsel of Greater
Nashville
WENDY J. TUCKER, Adjunct Professor of Law; Attorney, McGee, Lyons and Ballinger
TIMOTHY L. WARNOCK, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Riley Warnock & Jacobson
ROBERT C. WATSON, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Vice President & Chief Legal Officer, Metropolitan
Nashville Airport Authority
WILLIAM J. WHALEN, Adjunct Professor of Law; Chief Financial Officer, Roman Catholic Diocese of
Nashville
THE HONORABLE JUSTIN P. WILSON, Adjunct Professor of Law; Comptroller, State of Tennessee
THOMAS A. WISEMAN III, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Wiseman Ashworth Law Group























































































ADELE M. EL-KHOURI '13
ASHLEY E. JOHNSON '04
Alumni Advisory Committee
RYAN T. HOLT '10, Chair
J. MARIA GLOVER '07
WILLIAM T. MARKS '14
ANDREW R. GOULD'10
ROBERT S. REDER '78
Faculty Advisor
SEAN B. SEYMORE
Program Coordinator
FAYE JOHNSON

